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794 GAGE v. JORDAN [23 C.2d 
the tax rolls and to increase the tax burden on other prop-
erty with the net effect of penalizing property owners who 
pay their taxes. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's and respondents' petitions for a rehearing were 
denied April 18, 1944. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Tray-
nor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 18816. In Bank. Mar. 21,1944.] 
RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as 
Secretary of State, etc., et a1., Respondents; RETIRE-
MENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a 
Corporation) et al., Interveners. 
[1] Statutes - Enactment - Initiative: Construction - Liberal 
Construction-Initiative Statutes.-All doubt as to the con-
struction of pertinent provisions relating to an initiative 
measure is to be resolved in its favor, and such legislation 
is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded 
election statutes generally. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitutions-Intent 
of Framers: Statutes-Construction-Giving Effect to Leg-
islative Intent.-Where the language of a constitutional or 
statutory provision is susceptible of more than one meaning, 
it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the 
framers of the legislation, so far as such intent can be ascer-
tained. 
[3] Statutes-Construction-Circumstances Indicating Legisla-
tive Intent.-The purpose and object sought to be accomplished 
by legislation are of prime importance in ascertaining the 
legislative intent. 
[1] See 23 Cal.Jur. 675; 28 Am.Jur. 153. 
McK. ·Dig. References: [1] Statutes, §§69, 205; [2] Constitu-
tional Law, §25; Statutes, §114; [8] Statutes, §124j [4] Consti-
tutional Law, §167; Statutes, §167; [5] Elections, §146(3); [6-10] 
Statutes, §69. 
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[4] Constitutional Law-Construc.tloD .of Oonstitutions-Absurd-
ity: Statutes-Construction-Absurdity.--Where -the language 
of a constitutional or a statutory provision is fairly susceptible 
of two constructions, one of which, in a:pplicati?~,:wil1rend~r 
it reasonable, fa~ and harmonious ~t.~. ~t~ jlla~i!i~stp~ose; 
and another whIch would be productIve o( absurd . ~onse­
quences, the former construction:~i1l be.ad~pt,e~:·, . i ,/ ". " 
[5] Elections-Mandamus-Duties Enforceable-~repara~i~]l,' of 
Ballot.-Mandamus is the proper remedy:to"c\>nip'ef~heSec­
retary of State and a county registrar ofvotei-sto omiifrom 
any future ballot an initiative measure which oncefailed to 
qualify for want of sufficient signatures. ,::::,;"".'" ",.' 
[6] Statutes-Enactment-Initiative-Construction,::of ,Constitu;. 
tional Provisions.-Const., art. IV , §1, when ~ead in its en:-' 
tirety and in connection, with statutes enltCt'ed pursuant there-
to connotes an intention that insufficient initiativcpctitionB' sh~ll lapse and become functus officio; that is, it enforces It 
time limitation running from the "last preceding general elec-
tion" to the "next succeeding general election occurring to 
130 days after the presentation aforesaid of snid petition.'~ 
[7] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional 
Provisions.-Inasmuch as under Const., art. IV, §1, the pro-
cess of circulating initiative petitions must be completed 
within a designated time, at the expiration of which it be:-
comes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State 
"forthwith" to certify the measure for the ballot if it has suf-
ficient qualified signatures, the reasonable construction of sai4 
section is that if the measure does not qualify, the entire pro-
cedure must be instituted anew. 
[8] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutiona.l 
Provisions.-That part of Const., ~t. IV, §1, which declares 
that if any initiative measure be not submitted "at, the elec-
tion specified in this section," such failure shall not prevent 
its submission at a succeeding genera1 election, supports the 
construction that a petition which fails to qualify for the bal-
lot does not remain effective indefinitely thereafter, as it is 
only in case of the stated exception that a measure may go 
on the ballot at an election later than the "succeeding general 
election." 
[9] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional 
Provisions.-Those portions of Const., art. IV, §1, which pre-
scribe the manner in which signatures to an initiative petition 
are to be affixed and dated support the conclusion that the 
[4J See 23 Cal.Jur. 766; 25 R.C.L. 1019. 
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life of the petition is limited. It is intended that the sign-
ers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time of 
the signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the 
next general election, at which they are qualified to vote. 
[10] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Oonstruction of Oonstitutional 
Provisions.-'rhe word "presentation," as used in Const., art. 
IV, §1, is not synonymous with the word "filing," as used in 
said section with reference to an initiative petition being 
deemed filed on receipt by the Secretary of State of a certifi-
cate showing that the petition has the requisite number of 
signatures, so as to make the time at which the required 
number of signatures is obtained the time of "presentation." 
The reasonable construction is that the additional sections 
and supplements necessarily relate back to the "presentation" 
date of the first section presented, and thereafter, within the 
period, the petition is either "deemed to be flIed" by reason 
of the certification of enough signatures, or else it lapses be-
cause of its failure to qualify for the subsequent election. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel omission from 
ballot of proposed initiative constitutional amendment. Writ 
granted. 
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers and Pierce Works for 
Petitioner. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Charles W. Johnson 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Arthur McHenry; 
Deputy Attorney General, J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel 
(Los Angeles), and A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, 
for Respondent. 
Ellis E. Patterson, John J. Taheny, Jack B. Tenney Paul 
F. Fratessa, Philip C. Boardman, J. Lamar Butler and Law-
rence W. Allen for Interveners. 
CARTER, J.-Petitioner, a qualified elector of Los An-
geles County, applied to this court for a writ of mandate to 
compel the Secretary of State and the Registrar of Voters 
of Los Angeles County to omit from any ballot at any gen. 
~r~l. o~ special :lec~ion to be held in the future, the proposed 
InItiative constitutIOnal amendment known as the "Retire-
ment Life Payment Amendment," and entitled by the at-
torney general, "Gross Income Tax, Warrant Credits." Pe-
titioner also asked that the Secretary of State be compelled 
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to correct certificates of qualification transmitted by him 
in June, 1943, to the county clerk or registrar of voters of 
each county in the state by notifying those officials that 'the 
certificates should be disregarded, that the measure has never 
qualified, and that it must be omitted from any future ballot. 
An alternative writ issued, in return .to which the attorney 
general filed a demurrer and answer and the sponsors of the 
measure also intervened and answered. There is no dispute 
as to the facts. The issues joined present solely the problem 
of proper construction and application of article IV, sec-
tion 1, of the Constitution of this state, particularly the pro-
vision of the second paragraph of said section which reads 
as follows: 
"The ii.rst power reserved to the people shall 'be known as 
the initiative. Upon the presentation to the Secretary of 
State of a petition certified as herein provided to have been 
signed by qualified electors, equal in number to eight per 
cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for Governor at 
the last preceding general election, at which a Governor was 
elected, proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, 
set forth in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall 
submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Consti-
tution to the electors at the next succeeding general election 
occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation afore-
said of said petition, or at any special election called by the 
Governor in his discretion prior to such general election. 
. . ." (Italics ours.) 
The initiative measure here involved was first promulgated 
in 1940. On March 5th of that year the sponsors obtained 
from the attorney general a title and summary preparing 
the measure for submission to the voters as proposed article 
XXXII of the Constitution. Petitions for signatures were 
circulated in various counties and on May 29, 1940, the first 
certificates were received by the Secretary of State from 
county clerks. Supplemental certificates were received up 
to August 16, 1940, when a total of 196,498 signatures of 
qualified electors had been certified. 
The "last preceding" general election for governor, had 
been held in November, 1938, at which 2,651,463 .votes .were 
cast. As specified in the above quoted provision, 8 per 
cent of this number or. 212,117 signatures were required to 
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next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 
days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." The 
circulation of original, as distinguished from supplemental, 
petitions had been discontinued on June 28th, which was 
exactly 130 days prior to November 5, 1940, the date of the 
"next succeeding general election." Therefore, because of 
lack of sufficient signatures the measure did not qualify for 
a place on the ballot in November, 1940. A last minute at-
tempt to certify enough additional signatures to qualify the 
measure was unsuccessful ('1'hompson v. Kerr (1940), 16 
Cal.2d 130 (104 P.2d 1021]), and the eertified signatures lay 
dormant in the office of the Secretary of State through all of 
1941 and 1942. 
At the general election in November, 1942, however, only 
2,234,545 votes were cast for governor, 8 per cent of that. 
number being 178,764. Hence if the qualification, certifica-
tion, and presentation of signatures to the Secretary of State 
in 1940 did not become ineff'3ctive aud void upon' the failure 
of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot, there were by 
reason of the intervening 1942 election, enough signatures 
to qualify the measure for the 1944 ballot. Thus the ques-
tion is directly presented of whether or not an initiative 
measure, having once failed to qualify for the ballot for want 
of enough signatures, is automatically revitalized by a suffi-
cient decrease in the number of votes cast at a subsequent 
gubernatorial election to bring the number of signatures se-
cured within the 8 per cent limit based upon the number of 
votes cast at said subsequent election. 
In addition, it appears that in 1943, signatures were sought 
it;t Imperial County, .where petitions had not previously been 
CIrculated, and that m May of that year thirty-nine qualified 
signatures .from that county were certified to the Secretary of 
State. ThIS made a grand total of 196,537 signatures. But 
without these additional signatures there had already been 
certified more than sufficient to qualify the measure for the 
1944 ballot on the basis of 8 per cent of the votes cast in 
1942, if that basis could properly be employed upon the 
theory that the time for "presentation" to the Secretary of 
St~te (see above quoted provision) had not lapsed upon the 
failure of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot. Thus 
the further question is also presented whether all initiative 
petition received by the Secretary of State and continuing 
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to be circulated is not to be regarded as finally "presented" 
to or "filed" by him until it has sufficient signatures to qual-
ify for the ballot, regardless of how many years this may 
take. In this connection, paragraph 13 of section 1, supra, 
provides that "a petition shall be deemed to be filed with 
the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by him 
of a certificate or certificates showing said petiti~n to be 
signed by the requisite number of electors of.the ~tate." . 
Preliminary to a discussion of these questions,. It may be 
noted that the problem is one of first impressio~ up?n which 
no authority directly in point has been foundm t~lsor. any 
other jurisdiction of the United States. It inUst therefore 
be solved by a proper and reasonable construQtion of the 
quoted provision, read in pari "}atcria ~th~he'fulrc~n:ext 
of the section and all other pertment legislatIOn. -No .Slmllar 
situation will arise in the future because the Legislature iII 
1943 incorporated in the Elections Code a statlltecontain-
ing a time limitation provision (see Elec. Code,' sec. 1407, 
Stats. 1943, p. 1127). 
The desirability of having initiative measures,' particu-
larly those of such importance as the present one, reach the 
ballot without delay or excessive expenditures of time, money, 
and effort is a factor of which the courts are ever mindful. 
[1] All doubt as to the construction of pertinent pro-
visions is to be resolved in favor of the initiative and such 
.legislation is to be given the same liberal construction as that 
afforded election statutes generally (Ley v. Dominguez 
(1931), 212 Cal. 587 [299 P. 713] j see, also, OaZiforrvia 
Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934), 1 Ca1.2d 202 [34 P.2d 
134] j Willett v. Jordan (1934),1 Cal.2d 461 [35 P.2d 1025] ; 
Uhl v. Oollins (1932), 217 Cal. 1 (17 P.2d 99, 88 A.L.R. 
1371] j Hinkley v. Wells (1922), 57 Ca1.App. 206' [206 P. 
1023] ). [2] However, the interpretation adopted must be rea-
sonable and where the language is susceptible of more than 
one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that in-
tended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its inten-
tion can be ascertained. (Pacific Indemnity 00. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Oom. (1932), 215 Cal. 461, 464 [11 P.2d 1, 82 
A.L.R. 1170] j San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Oom. (1920), 
183 Cal. 273 [191 P. 26].) [3] The purpose and object sought 
to be accomplished by the legislation are of prime impor-
tance in ascertaining that intention (Oity and Oounty of 
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San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [112 P.2d 
595] ; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal. 
2d 287 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028]; Estate 0/ Ryan, 
21 Ca1.2d 498-513 [133 P .2d 626]). [4] Furthermore, 
where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions, 
one which, in application will render it reasonable, fair a.nd 
harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another WhICh 
would be productive of absurd consequences, the former con-
struction will be adopted. (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. 
v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 648 [91 P.2d 577] ; Dept. of Motor 
Vehicles v. Industrial Ace. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 
~] ; 23 Ca1.Jur. 766.) 
~ [5] Under circumstallces such as those here presented. 
mandamus is the proper remedy (Felt v. Waughop, 193 Cal. 
498 [225 P. 862] ; Bordwell v. Williams, 173 Cal. 283 [159 
P. 869, Ann. Cas. 1918E 358, L.R.A. 1917A, 996]). 
[6] Article IV, scction 1, of t.he OonstitutiOl;, whi?h was 
adopted in 1911, specifies in detaIl the manner In whIch. the 
legislative power reserved to the People may be exercIsed 
by means of the initiative and the referendum. It sets forth 
a complete plan or scheme and when read in its entirety, 
together with statutes enacted pursuant to it, it clearly con-
notes an intention that insufficient petitions shall lapse and 
become functus officio; that is, it imports a time limitation 
running from the "last preceding general election" to the 
"next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 
130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." 
The significance of the term" presentation" will be discussed 
later. 
The steps in the initiative procedure are first, the enti-
tling and summarization of the measure by the attorney gen-
eral (sec. 1, supra, par. 8; Elec. Oode, secs. 1401, 1452), and 
second, its circulation among the voters (sec. 1, supra, 
par. 9). The petition for signatures of electors may be cir-
culated in sections, each section containing a full and correct 
copy of the title and text of the proposed measure (sec. 1, 
supra, par. 9). Each section may be filed with the clerk or 
registrar of voters of the county in which it was circulated, 
but all sections circulated in any county are to be filed at 
the same time (sec. 1, supra, par. 10). 
There is, it is true, no prohibition against circulation of 
sections of petitions in any county indefinitely, and no spe-
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~ific time provision for completion of the entire process other 
than the period between general elections prescribed by the 
second paragraph of section 1, first herein quoted, or, more 
specifically, between a period commencing 130 days befor? a 
general election and 130 days before the second succeedIng 
election. Obviously, with a then two-year period for regis-
tration, it was necessary that the petition be filed with the 
county clerk or registrar of voters within such a limited time 
as would enable him to determine whether the signers were 
qualified electors. The detailed provisions of section 1, pro-
viding an entire plan of procedure, impose meticulous time 
limitations for completion of various intermediate steps of 
the process, all of which would be utterly meaningless if 
petitions could be held over as valid indefinitely, or could 
be revitalized by any subsequent drop in the gubernatorial 
vote. 
[7] Consider the following provisions, which seem obvi-
ously to be directed at insuring that a measure, if it qualifies, 
shall go upon the ballot at the next succeeding general election 
occurring 130 days or more after the presentation to the 
Secretary of State of the initial certified petition, and that 
if it does not qualify, the entire procedure must be insti-
tuted anew: 
1. The percentage of vote at the "last preceding general 
election" determines the qualification standard (sec. 1, 
par. 2, supra). 
2. The proposed law must, if qualified for the ballot, be 
submitted "at the next succeeding general election occurring 
subsequent to 130 days after the presentation . . . of said 
petition" (sec. 1, par. 2, supra). 
3. To insure completion of the process within this period, 
the measure must first be submitted to the attorney general 
for a title and summary. The submission must be made 
"prior to circulation of any initiative petition for signatures 
thereof," (Sge art. IV, sec. 1, par. 8), and the attorney gen-
eral must provide a ballot title and return the measure to 
the Secretary of State within 10 days after it is filed with 
him (Elec. Oode, secs. 1401, 1452). Paragraph 8, supra, of 
section 1, also states that the persons presenting a measure 
to the attorney general with a written request for title and 
summary "shall be known as 'proponents' of said proposed 
measure, " and that "The Attorney General shall preserve 
23 O.2d-U 
, ' 
Ii' i ' 
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said written request until after the next general election." 
Hence "after the next general election," there is no longer 
any title and summary, and without a title and summary 
there can be no "proponents" and no "measure." 
4. All sections circulated in a county must be filed with 
the clerk at the same time, to the end that the signatures 
may be checked within the short period of 20 days. As 
stated in paragraph 10 of section 1, supra: "Within twenty 
days after the filing of such petition in his office the said 
clerk or registrar of voters, shall determine from the records 
of registration what number of qualified electors have signed 
the same. . . ." . 
5. Additional help is provided; to wit: "If necessary the 
board of supervisors shall allow said clerk or registrar of 
voters additional assistants for the purpose of examining 
said petition and provide for their compensation." (Sec. 1, 
supra, par. 10.) 
6. The clerk or registrar "upon completion" of the exami-
nation is to "forthwith transmit" the petition, together with 
his certificate to the Secretary of State. (Sec. 1, supra, 
par. 10.) 
7. The time within which the Secretary of State may act 
is definitely limited. "When the Secretary of State shall 
have received" the certified petition signed by the requisite 
number of qualified electors, "he shall forthwith transmit" 
to the clerk or registrar his cer'~ificate showing that fact. 
(Italics ours.) (Sec. 1, supra, par. 13.) 
8. A limited period for filing supplemental petitions is 
specified. "Within forty days from the transmission" of 
the petition and certificate by the clerk to the Secretary of 
State, a supplemental petition, identical with the original 
but containing additional names, may be filed with the clerk 
or registrar. (Italics ours.) (Sec. 1, supra, par. 10.) 
9. Ten days are allowed the clerk to certify the result of 
his examination of the supplemental petition to the Secretary 
of State (sec. 1, par. 12, supra). 
Hence in each respective county where petitions are cir-
culated, the process must be completed within 70 days from 
the first filing of sections of any petition with the county 
clerk or registrar, to wit: 20 days to check first sections, 40 
days to secure supplemental names, and 10 days to check 
supplemental names. At the expiration of this period it 
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becomes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State 
to forthwith certify the measure for the ballot if it has suffi-
cient qualified signatures, measured by the last preceding 
gubernatorial vote (sec. 1, supra, pars. 2, 13). 
In view of these express time limits and provisions for 
"forthwith" action, any construction of the second para-
graph of section 1 which would destroy their effectiveness 
and render them meaningless would be clearly unreasonable 
and contrary to the intent of the framers of the legislation. 
[8] In addition to the evidence of intent supplied by the 
provisions above discussed, it may be worthy of note that 
paragraph 7 of section 1 affords protection to measures which 
have qualified but which, due to negligence or misprision, 
have not been placed on the ballot. It provides: "If for 
any reason any initiative ... proposed by petition as herein 
provided, be not submitted at the election specified in this 
section, such failure shall not prevent its submission at a 
succeeding general election .... " (Italics ours.) This lan-
guage affords support for the construction urged by peti-
tioner here because it shows that only in the CaBe of the 
.stated exception may a mcasure go on the ballot at an elec-
tion later than the (t succeeding general election." 
Contemporaneous construction placed upon section 1 
by the Le~islature of 1911, the· same Lcgi:;lnturc which 
drafted the constitutional provision, is also significant. Po-
litical Code, section 4058 (Stat.\;. 1911, p. 577), in specifying 
the procedure for county initiatives, provided that if an 
initiative petition was found to be insufficient, it should be 
"returned to the person filing the sam~, without prejudice, 
however, to the filing of a new petition to the same effect." 
(Italics ours.) In incorporating this section in the Elections 
Code as section 1607, the Legislature of 1943 emphasized 
the point by providing that "the failure to secure sufficient 
signatures shall not prejudice the filing later of an entirely 
new petition to the same effect." A similar provision with 
reference to municipal initiatives was also enacted (Stats. 
Extra Sess., 1911, chap. 33, p. 131, sec. 1). 
The most recent direct expression of the legislative in-
tent is that already referred to, the enactment of new sec-
tion 1407 of the Elections Code (Stats. 1943, p. 1127) pro-
viding that no petitions shall be circulated until after the 
official summary date and that first petitions with signatures 
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must then be filed with the county clerk or registrar "not 
later than 90 days from the 'Official summary date' . . . and 
no clerk or registrar of voters shall accept first petitions on 
such proposed initiative measure thereafter." Is not this a 
clear recognition that the framers of the Constitution never 
intended that initiative measures should remain alive for 
!ear after ye~r in the hope that they might ultimately qual-
Ify at some dIstant future election? 
[9] The detailed provisions of paragraphs 9 and 10 of 
section 1, prescribing the manner in which signatures are to 
be affixed and dated also fortify the conclusion that the life 
of the petitions is not to be unlimited. The manifest pur-
pose of such provisions, as stated in Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal. 
App. 611 [204 P. 237], and approved in Boggs v. Jordan, 
204 Cal. 207, 216 [267 P. 696], "is to guard against signa-
tures by persons who are not qualified electors at the time 
of signing," thus making certain that no initiative measure 
shall appear upon the ballot unless it has been petitioned for 
by the requisite number of electors who are then qualified 
to vote upon the measure at the forthcoming election at which 
it is to be submitted. In other words, it is intended that the 
signers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time 
of signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the 
next general election, at which they are qualified to vote. 
As electors change each year, through death, coming of age, 
rem?val, neglect to qualify, and the like, any construction of 
sectlOn 1, supra, which would permit the qualified electors of 
one year t.o determine largely the measures liable to go on 
the ballot lD a subsequent year would lead to confusion and 
uncertaint~, and would be contrary to public policy. 
Illustrative of the impossible situation to which such a 
co~struction might lead, consider a measure first circulated 
prlOr to 1943, upon which signatures are allowed to cumulate 
year after year until the measure ultimately qualifies with 
refe~enc~ to the last gubernatorial election preceding the last 
certIficatlOn to the Secretary of State from any r,ountv in 
the state. Under this theory, as long as there remains' one 
county out of the fifty-eight in the state in which a section 
of the .petition has not been filed, the measure is eligible 
to qualIfy at some future gubernatorial election when the 
~c~umulative total of signatures of electors, past, present, 
lIVlDg, dead, or removed from the state, shall equal the re-
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quired 8 per cent of the vote cast at the then "last preced-
ing election." Such a measure first proposed in 1912 might 
ultimately (allowing one filing in one county per year) qual-
ify for the ballot circa A. D. 1970, or if there were one filing 
in one county every other year, it might qualify about 
A. D. 2028. That the constitutional provision could so op-
erate was obviously never intended by the framers, and such 
a construction is too unreasonable to contemplate. Present 
day electors are not interested in initiating legislation to be 
finally adopted by their children or children's children. 
The measure here under consideration was initiated with 
the intent that it should appear on the 1940 ballot. Since 
that year, there has been a drastic change in economic con-
ditions, the nation has found itself in an exhaustive war, 
vast numbers of the people have surged to the western coast 
and many others have been removed by reason of war condi-
tions. It may safely be assumed that many who signed as 
sponsors of the measure might refuse to sign were it sub-
mitted to them today, and the present electorate should not 
be burdened with their undertaking. The fact that it is not 
only reasonable, but desirable to limit the time for the quali-
fication of initiative measure is commented upon as follows 
in the case of State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, 77 Wash. 651 
[138 P. 286] : 
"It, of course, is necessary that some practical test be pro-
vided for determining whether the signers of the petitions 
are legal voters. It is, of course, but fair that the petitioris 
should, so far as practical, be signed only by those who would 
be voters at the election. This can be secured with greater 
certainty by having the petitions signed as near the time of 
the election as practical. We all know that our electorate 
is not the same from year to year. Weare of the opinion 
that it is within the power of the Legislature to fix a reason-
able limit of time preceding the election within which an 
initiative measure may be filed with the Secretary of State." 
See, also, State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171 [187 
N.E. 301], where a somewhat similar problem was resolved 
in accord with the views here expressed. 
[10] Much of the argument in the briefs centers upon the 
meaning of the word "presentation" as used in section 1, 
and its asserted synonymy with the word "filing" as used 
in that section. The words in their usual and ordinary 
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sense are not generally defined as synonymous. For example, 
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines to 
"present" as, among other things, "to lay before, or submit 
to, a person or body for consideration or action; as to pre-
sent a memorial, petition, or indictment," whereas to "file" 
is defined as: "(a) To deliver (a paper or instrument) to 
the proper officer so that it is received by him to be kept on 
file, or among the records of his office. (b) Of the receiving 
officer, to place (a paper or instrument) on file among the 
records of his office by receiving, endorsing, entering, or the 
like. " In this state the distinction between the two expres-
sions was early noted in the case of Estate of Giovanni Sbar-
boro (1883), 63 Cal. 5. To express the difference precisely 
it would be proper to say that ordinarily a document is "pre-
sented" to an official for "filing," but the filing is subse-
quent to rather than copcurrent with the presentation. 
In section 1 the word "presentation," or "presenting," 
or "presented" appears nine times, while the word "file" or 
"filing" or "filed" appears eleven times. Although the re-
spective terms appear clearly to have been chosen with under-
standing of their exact meaning and to have been used with 
precise discrimination, yet it is argued that the "presenta-
tion " under paragraph 2 of section 1, first herein quoted, 
does not in fact occur until sufficient signatures have been 
certified to qualify the measure for the ballot; or, in other 
words, that the "presentation" is synonymous with the" fil-
ing" referred to in the provision of paragraph 13 of sec-
tion 1, which states "a petition shall be deemed to be filed 
with the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by 
him of a certificate or certificates showing said petition to be 
signed by the requisite number of electors of the State." 
Under this theory it is said that initiative petitions are 
neither presented nor filed until they are certified to have 
been signed by a sufficient number of qualified electors, and 
that this may occur either in the year that the initiative 
measure is first promUlgated and sections from certain coun-
ties are presented, or in some later year. To state the proc-
ess another way then, the time at which the requisite per-
centage of signatures is obtained, is to determine the time 
of "presentation" and also which election is the "last pre-
ceding general election," and which is the "next succeeding 
general election .•• " at which the measure must be submitted 
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to the voters. In the present case it is said that at no time 
prior to November, 1942, did the petitions bear sufficient 
signatures; therefore upon the certification in May, 1943, of 
thirty-nine signatures from Imperial county, it became the 
duty of the Secretary of State to consider the petition finally 
"presented" or ., filed, " under the signature computation 
based on returns from the then "last preceding general plpe-
tion, " the election of 1942, and to certify the measure for 
the ballot in 1944. 
The very statement of this complex proposi~ion ~s in-
dicative of its weakness. Section 1 clearly proVIdes m ex-
press terms for "presentation" to the Secretary of State of 
a certified petition, which is to qualify the ~eas.ure for. the 
ballot at the next succeeding general electIon If sufficIent 
signatures are obtained within the required time. It con-
templates that all steps in the initiative proceeding, shall. be 
taken not less than 130 days prior to the general electIOn 
next following the institution of the proceeding, and that 
the sufficiency of the petition is to be tested by the last pre- . 
ceding gubernatorial vote. In view of the privilege given of 
circulating the petition in sections, and of filing supplements 
to it, it appears that the additional sections and supplements 
necessarily relate back to the" presentation" date of the first 
section presented. Thereafter, within the PE?riod, the peti-
tion is either "deemed to be filed" by reason of the certifica~ 
tion of enough signatures, or else it lapses because of its fail-
ure to qualify for the subsequent election. This construction 
is not only reasonable, but it gives effect to all of the per-
tinent provisions of the section without straining the phrase-
ology, and it appears to accord with the intent of the fram.ers 
of the legislation: That the presentation precedes the filmg 
of the petition is indicated by the provision in paragraph 9 
of section 1 that: "Unless and until it be otherwise proven 
upon official investigation, it shall be presumed that the peti-
tion presented contains the signatures of the requisite num-
ber of qualified electors." This must refer to the required 
8 per cent as there is no limit on the number of signatures 
to be obtained in any particular county and the Secretary 
of State is the official whose duty it is to determine the requi~ 
site number of qualified signers to authorize the filing of a 
petiticm. 
Here the petition was "presented" in May, 1940; the "last 
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preceding general election" was the election of 1938, hence 
the petition lapsed when it failed to qualify for the Novem-
ber, 1940 ballot. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur. Under the theory advocated by 
respondents and interveners, a group of persons, relatively 
small in the total population of the state, could settle in one 
county, register as electors, sign sections of the petition, file 
it in that county, then move on to another county, register 
there, sign and file new sections of the petition there, and 
repeat the process in as many counties of the state and over 
such a period of time as might be necessary to reach the goal 
of the number of qualified signatures equal to 8 per cent 
of the number of votes cast for governor at some election 
many years subsequent to the presentation of the first section 
of the petition. 
Although the constitutional provision is unfortunately am-
biguous, this court could not justify giving it a construction 
which would not only admit of, but would commit us to per-
mit, such an absurd application of the law as that suggested 
above. Furthermore, to uphold respondents' and interven-
ers' contentions that the constitutional provision contains 
no limitation upon the time within which petitions must be 
qualified would be tantamount to holding that the pertinent 
1943 act of the Legislature (Elec. Code, sec. 1407; Stats. 
1943, p. 1127) is unconstitutional. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-The vital question in this 
proceeding is whether an initiative petition that fails for 
want of enough signatures to qualify the proposed measure 
for submission to the voters at the next general election after 
the receipt of the petition by the Secretary of State, remains 
effective indefinitely thereafter, enabling the proposed meas-
ure to qualify for the ballot on the basis of any general elec-
tion for governor that succeeds the receipt of the petition by 
the Secreta.ry of State. The answer to this question turns 
on the meaning of the second paragraph of section 1 of ar-
ticle IV of the California Constitution, which provides: 
"Upon the presentation to the Secretary of State of a peti-
tion certified as herein provided to have been signed by quali-
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tied electors, equal in number to eight' per cent of all the 
votes cast for all candidates for Gov:ernor at the last pre-
eeding general election, at which a Governor was elected, 
proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, set forth 
in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall submit 
the said proposed law or amendment to the Oonstitution to 
the electors at the next succeeding general election occurring 
subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid .of 
said petition, or at any special election called by the Governor 
in his discretion prior to such general election." 
This provision is ambiguous. It does not make clear what 
constitutes the presentation of the petition, for it speaks, not 
simply of the presentation of a petition, but of the presenta-
tion of a petition certified to have been signed !by the requi-
site number of qualified electors. It cannot be determined 
whether such a petition has been presented without first as-
certaining what is the last preceding general election, which 
is the basis for determining whether the 8 per cent require-
ment has been met. The last general election preceding the 
presentation of the petition, however, as well as "the next 
succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days 
after the presentation" of the petition, cannot be ascertained 
without first determining what constitutes that presenta-
tion. The identification of either event depends upon the 
identification of the other under a literal construction of the 
second paragraph of section 1, and is therefore bound to be 
frustrated in this circle. 
The attorney general, conceding that the paragraph in 
question is ambiguous, contends that the riddle is solved by 
the thirteenth paragraph of section 1 if the word "filed" 
therein is construed, as he contends it should be, to mean 
"presented." That paragraph provides: "A petition shall 
be deemed to be filed with the Secretary of State upon the 
date of the receipt by him of a certificate or certificates 
showing said petition to be signed by the requisite number 
of electors of thc State." Even if it were assumed that the 
word "filed" in the forcgoing- provision is synonymous with 
the word "presented," however, the last preceding general 
election as well as the presentation of the petition, would re-
main unidentified, for the petition would not be filed or 
presented until the Secretary of State received certificates 
showing the petition "to be signed by the requisite number 
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of electors of the state." Since the Secretary of State would 
not know whether the petition was signed by "the requisite 
number of electors of the state" until he knew what" the last 
preceding general election" was, the attorney general's con-
tention leads directly back to the second paragraph of sec-
tion 1. 
It is contended that since the petition may be presented 
in sections, the presentation of the petition is not it sin~l€' 
act but a continuing process. Under this theory the receIpt 
of the last certificate is as much a presentation of the peti-
tion as the receipt of the first, so that the last preceding 
general election may be regarded as the one preceding the 
receipt of the last certificate if all the certificates show that 
the petition has been signed by the requisite number of elec-
tors. There is no more reason, however, for selecting the 
date of receipt of the last certificate as the date of presenta-
tion than there would be for selecting the date of receipt of 
the first. Moreover, if all the certificates in the hands of 
the Secretary of State prior to 130 days before the next 
general election do not show that the petition has been signed 
by the requisite number of electors the receipt of neither the 
first certificate nor the last can fix the date of presentation. 
The contention is then advanced that regardless of how 
many general· elections occur after the certificates are first 
received by the Secretary of State, as soon as any general 
election occurs at which a governor is elected and at which 
the total number of votes cast for all candidates for governor 
is such that the total signatures shown by the certificates 
then in the hands of the Secretary of State equals at least 
8 per cent of that total vote, the petition must be regarded 
as presented, and that election becomes the "last preceding 
general election." Under this theory the date of presenta-
tion would be a constantly shifting one that would not be-
come fi.'{ed unless the number of signatures certified to be 
signed to the petition equalled at least 8 per cent of the votes 
cast at the most recent ~(Jncral election at which a governor 
was elected. The identification of one unknown, namely, the 
date of presentation, is thus arrived at by determining that 
the other unknown, namely, "the last preceding general elec-
tion," is any general election after the initiation of the proc-
ess that would qualify the measure. Under this interpreta-
tion the words "the last preceding general election at which 
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a governor was elected" would become the most recent gen-
eral election at which 8 per cent of the total number of· 
votes cast for all candidates for governor equals or falls short 
of the number of signatures certified to have been· signed to 
the petition. "The last preceding general election " could 
thus be any general election succeeding the institution of the 
initiative proceeding, depending upon the number of votes 
cast at the election and on the number of signatures certified 
to be signed to the petition. The words tI the last preceding 
general election" however indicate plainly that the framers 
of section 1 were referring to one particular election. The 
general election preceding the institution of the initiative 
proceeding seems more likely to be in. accord with their in-
tention than one of a number of general elections succeeding 
the institution of such proceeding. In any event, the attor-
ney general's interpretation is certainly not compelled by the 
language of section 1. Since it would lead to the absurdities 
so graphically described in the majority opinion and thus 
violate the principle that constitutional provisions will not 
be interpreted to produce an unreasonable or absurd result, 
it must be rejected. (See 23 Cal.Jur. 722-3; 766-7.) 
It remains for the court, therefore, in the light of section '1 
as a whole, to identify "the last preceding general election," 
as well as the presentation of the petition, so that the section 
can operate in accord with the probable intention of its fram-
ers. A consideration of the instances in which there can be 
no doubt as to the operation of the section removes much 
of the confusion regarding its operation in a case like the 
present one. , 
If the Secretary of State receives a petition, prior to 130 
days before the next general election, certified to be signed 
by electors equal in number to at least 8. per cent of all the 
votes cast for governor at the general ,election at which a 
governor was elected preceding the, receipt of the, petition, 
he must submit the proposed law or constitutional amend-
ment to the electors at that next general election, or stan" 
special election called by the governor before such general 
election. If he receives a petition that, prior·to,130, days 
before the next general election, is not so certmed,jle cannot 
submit the proposed law or constitutional amendment to the: 
voters at that next general election, or at any: ,intervening 
special election. What happens to such a petition t Is it 
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revitalized by the receipt of additional certificates certifying 
that more signatures have been added to the petition? If 
the base election for determining whether the petition has 
the requisite number of signatures is the election preceding 
the receipt of the petition by the Secretary of State, it would 
be idle for the Secretary of State to receive additional cer-
tificates certifying that more signatures have been added to 
the petition, for it cannot be submitted at the next general 
election following the receipt by the Secretary of State of the 
petition. That election may already have been held. In any 
event the 130-day requirement canllot be met; for that rea-
son the Secretary of State in 1940 refused to accept signa-
tures from Tuolumne County certified to be signed to the 
very petition involved in this case, for they were received 
within less than 130 days before the election held on Novem-
ber 5, 1940. 
It appears from the foregoing description of the proce-
dure followed when a proposed measure clearly does or does 
not qualify for submission at a particular election, that the 
base election must be the election preceding the receipt of 
the petition by the Secretary of State, for otherwise he could 
never determine whether a petition had, within the time 
prescribed, the requisite number of signatures. He makes 
that determination in the only way that he can under the 
Constitution by ascertaining the total vote for all candidates 
for governor at the last general election at which a governor 
was elected preceding the receipt by him of the petition. If 
the petition were not regarded as presented to him, he could 
not proceed with his determination whether it had, within 
the prescribed time, the requisite number of signatures. Only 
by regarding the receipt by him of the petition as the presen-
tation of the petition to him can he determine what is the 
next preceding general election, the basis of his determina-
tion whether the petition has been signed within the pre-
scribed time by electors equal in number to at least 8 per 
cent of the total vote for all candidates for governor at 
that election. 
Since the foregoing procedure is the one that the Secre-
tary of State follows, and the only one that he can follow if 
he is to comply with the 8 per cent requirement and the 130-
day limitation in passing upon initiative measures that 
clearly do or do not qualify for submission to the electors 
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at a particular general election, it must be regarded' as' the 
procedure that the framers of section 1 envisaged for all 
cases. This procedure conforms to the provisions of section 1. 
Thus it appears that the presentation of the petition may be 
made in sections (par. 9); that the presentation of each .. 
section consists of the transmission by a county clerk' or regis-
trar of a printed copy of the petition with his certificate 
showing the number of qualified signatures thereto that have 
been filed in his county (par. 10); that the presentation of 
the several sections may occur at different times, since each 
county clerk or registrar is required to transmit his section 
as soon as he completes his examination of the signatures 
(par. 10); that the Secretary of State has no duty to per-
form in this regard other than' to receive' the sections pre-
sented to him by the county clerks or registrars until the 
total number of signatures certified in the severaJ sections 
is at least 8 per cent of all the votes cast for gov.ernor at 
the last general election at which a governor was elected pre-
ceding the presentation. If the signatures certified in the 
sections meet that requirement prior to 130 days before the 
next succeeding general election, the Secretary of State must 
submit the proposed measure at that election. It follows that 
a petition is presented to the Secretary of State upon the first 
date when one or more sections, containing "a full and cor-
rect copy of the title and text of the proposed measure" are 
received by him duly accompanied by a certificate from the 
county clerk or clerks transmitting the petition as to the 
number of signatures obtained in the particular county or 
counties. Thereafter the Secretary of State simply keeps 
count of additional signatures certified to be signed to the 
petition, to determine whether or not the measure qualifies 
for submission at the next general election occurring more 
than 130 days after the receipt of the petition. If it quali-
fies it goes on the ballot; if not, it does not go on the ballot 
and is thenceforth defunct. The Secretary of State is with-
out authority to submit a measure at a subsequent election, 
that does not qualify for submission at the election succeed-
ing the presentation of the petition, for the Constitution au-
thorizes submission of the measure only at the next succeed-
ing general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after 
the presentation of the petition or at any special election 
called by the Governor before such general election. If the 
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measure qualifies for submission to the electors at that next 
succeeding general election, however, but for any reason it 
is not submitted then under the seventh paragraph of sec-
. , . 
tion 1, it may be submitted at a succeeding general electlOn. 
Since the proposed measure did not qualify under the pre-
scribed procedure for submission to the electors at the elec-
tion held on November 5, 1940, and since the Constitution 
does not authorize the Secretary of State to submit, at any 
subsequent election, a measure that fails to qualify for the 
next succeeding general election occurring after the presen-
tation of the petition, the proposed measure cannot be sub-
mitted to the electors. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-In 1911, by an amendment 
to the Constitution, the People of California declared that 
they "reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and 
amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the 
same at the polls independent of the Legislature, , . ." Elec-
tion laws are to be liberally construed, and a proposed initia-
tive measure should hav; a place upon the ballot unless, 
considering the fundamental purpose of the constitutional 
reservation of power, it may fairly be said that the require-
ments for such legislation have not been met. Indeed, ,courts 
should protect the right of the people to initiate and vote 
upon a measure which, in the opinion of some electors, would 
advance social or economic conditions, with the same regard 
for democratic principles as is demanded when the right of 
free speech is under consideration. Yet by the decision in 
the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the Consti-
tution does not directly limit the time within which a petition 
to place a proposed measure on the ballot may be circulated, 
because of general provisions specifying the procedure to be 
followed in connection with the verification of voters' signa-
tures by the county election officials, the People are denied 
the right to vote upon "The Retirement Life Payments 
Amendment. " I cannot subscribe to such a narrow con-
struction of the Constitution. 
Certainly paragraph 2 of the constitutional provision is 
unfortunately worded. It declares: "Upon the presentation 
to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as herein 
provided to have been signed by qualified electors, equal in 
number to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candi. 
dates for Governor at the last preceding general election, 
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at which a Governor was elected, proposing a law or amend-
ment to the Constitution, set forth in full in said petition, 
the Secretary of State shall submit the said proposed law or 
amendment to the Constitution to the electors at the next 
succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days 
after the presentation aforesaid of said petition, or at any 
special election called by the Governor in his discretion prior 
to such general election." (Const., art. IV, sec. 1.) The use 
of the word "presentation" in the quoted sentence giV'Eis rise 
to the principal difficulty in this case, for the Constituti?n also 
specifies: "A petition shall be deemed to be filed WIth the 
Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt 'by him of a 
certificate or certificates showing said petition to. be signed 
by the reqUisite number of electors of the State." But ~he~ 
all of the constitutional provisions are read together, It IS. 
clear that a petition, as distinguished from a section of a 
petition, is presented to the Secretary of State only when it 
bears a sufficient number of signatures to qualify the pro-
posed measure for a place upon the ballot. 
The constitutional provision specifying the procedure for 
the qualification and submission of an initiative or referen-
dum measure uses the word "presentation" or "presenting" 
or "presented" nine times. The word "file" or "filing" or 
"filed" appears eleven times. The use of each of these words, 
when considered in connection with its context, shows a dis-
criminating choice of language. For example: "Any initia-
tive or referendum petition may be presented in sections, but 
each section shall contain a full and correct copy of the title 
and text of the proposed measure." Certainly the word 
• ',..1.. "fil d " "presented" as here used IS not synonymous Whu e , 
for an initiative measure "shall be deemed to be filed" with 
the Secretary of State only when he has received a certifi-
cate or certificates signed by the requisite number ofelectol'S. 
Other sentences also show that the Constitution's' drafts-
man clearly understood the meaning of the words he selected., 
The sponsors of an initiative measure are de~ed as the per.~ . 
sons "presenting" a request to the attorney general for th~ 
preparation of a title and summary of it. By 'ilnother p~o~ 
vision the persons who shall "prepare and present"argti~ 
ments for and against each measure shall be selected b~ the 
presiding officer of the Senate. Ina subsequent paragraph 
relating to the rights of proponents, there is a restriction con~ 
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cerning any section or supplement "presented for filing." 
1\. use of the ".ord in the same manner appears in the 
requirement as to the printing of the title, "Initiative meas-
ure to be presented to the Legislature." Here are instances 
of a precise usc of the word "present" in its customary and 
usual meaning, which is: "To lay before, or submit to, a 
person or body for consideration or action; a..~ to present 
a memorial, petition or indictment." (Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary, 2d ed.) But the filing of a paper or 
document connotes the finality of official action which follows 
presentation. 
Applying these definitions to the constitutional provisions, 
it clearly appears that the "presentation" to the Secretary 
of State of a petition certified as having been signed by the 
required number of qualified electors is not a single act. 
"Any initiative ... petition may be presented in sections," 
the Constitution reads. Each county clerk or registrar of 
voters must examine the signatures upon each section of a 
petition filed with him. As soon as he completes such exami-
nation, he shall "forthwith" attach his certificate to a copy 
of the petition, except the signatures, "and shall forthwith 
transmit said petition, together with his said certificate" to 
the Secretary of State. Obviously, in practice, these docu-
ments will be received at different times, and, of necessity, 
the "presentation" to the Secretary of State of a petition 
by sections can only be made by the delivery to him, through 
a county clerk or registrar of voters, of a copy of the petition 
with a certificate made by the local election officer that it has 
been signed by a stated number of electors, qualified .to do so. 
Other than to receive the sections, the Secretary of Sfate has 
no duty to perform unless and until the aggregate "of the 
number of signers certified in the several sections amounts 
"to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for 
Governor at the last preceding general election at which a 
Governor was p.lected." If and when the number of signa-
tures as certified to him total that amount, the petition" shall 
be deemed to be filed" and he shall "submit the said pro-
posed law or amendment to the Constitution to the elec-
tors .... " 
Under this construction, there is no time limit within 
which the qualification of an initiative petition must be com-
pleted. Sections of the petition may be circulated indefi-
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nitely in any county. But upon the filing of a sectionfu0r 
sections with a county clerk or registrar of vo~er~, all r-
ther action in that county must be completed .WlthI~ seve~ty 
days. There is no prohibition, however, a~amst CIrculatIon 
of the petition in any other county, and SIgnatures may be 
obtain cd until the aggregate of them, as certified by the local 
election officials, reaches the required number.. . . 
Admittedlv with no limitation of time for the qualification 
of a propos~d measure except the requirem~nts. as. to circu· 
lation in a particular county, a law or conStIt~t~onalamend­
ment might be submitted to electors many years. after the 
petition for its enactment was signed by some of them.. But 
a court may not place restrictions upo~ the procedure fo; 
direct legislation which are not found eIther In th.e CO~StI~ 
. tution or in any statute enacted to facilitate i~s 0I?eratI?n. 
Certainly section 45 of the Elections Code,' whlch IS rehed 
upon by counsel for Gage, makes no requirement, ,as to the 
time when an initiative measure must be placed upon the 
ballot. Based upon section 1083a of the Politic&, Code,. a 
predecessor statute, it declares that o~;y .0n,e who~s. a regis· 
tered qualified elector may sign an !m~IatIve pe~Itlon, and 
that he must also write the date of SIgnmg and hIS place of 
residence. In Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611 [204 P. 237], 
the Political Code section was upheld as legislation which 
facilitates the operation of the constitutional plan and places 
safeguards around the exercise of the right to have a pro· 
posed law or constitutional amendment voted on by the peo-
ple. (See, also, Boggs v. Jordan, 204 Cal. 207, 214 [267 P. 
696].) But the statute cannot reasonably ?e. ~o~trued .~ a 
requirement either that each signe~ of an mlt~atIve. pe~ItIon 
be a qualified elector both at the time of. affixmg hIS sI~a­
ture· and on the date of the election at WhICh the propOSItIon 
is submitted to a vote, or as a restriction upon the time within 
which such a petition may be presented to the Secretary of 
State. 
As another ground for the issuance of a writ of I?andate 
in this proceeding, it is insisted that the gubernatorIal elec-
tion which fixes the number of signatures required for a 
petition is the one which i~med~ately preced~s every step 
in the initiative procedure mcludmg presentatIon. In. ~up­
port of that construction, reference. is made to. provlsI~ns 
of the Constitution and of the ElectIons Code Wlth relation 
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to the preparation of a title and summary for any proposed 
measure. 
Sect.ion ~452 of the Elections Cod~ allows anyone inter-
ested In dIrect legislation, "at any time prior to one hun-
dred thirty days before the clection at which the measure 
is to be voted upon," to request a ballot title for it. As con-
strued by c~unsel for Gae-e, this means that the request must 
be made prIor to 130 days before the next gencral election. 
But the language cannot be so limited. By the express terms 
of the statute, the election at which the proposed measure is 
to be voted upon need not necessarily be the next one after 
the r~qu~t for a title is made, and the proponents of the 
constItutIOnal amendment which is the subject of the pres-
ent ~roceeding, mor~ than 130 days before the date of any 
ele~tIOn to be held In the year 1943,complied with the re-
qUIrement regarding entitlement. 
The constitutional. mandate directing the attorney general 
~~ p~eserve the wrItten request for a title and summary 
untIl after th.e next general election" (art. IV, sec. 1, 
pa~. 8), also relIed upon by counsel for Gage, is more to the 
POInt. From this language it is argued that the initiative 
procl!ss must be commenced and completed between two con-
secutive general elections. Certainly the direction to the 
attorney general affords some basis for believing that the 
draftsman of the Constitution intended that the record of 
the request for entitlement be kept only until the electors 
had voted upon the measure, and that this would occur at 
"the .next gen:ral electi~n." Bu~ su~h a conclusion is largely 
~urmIse, and In construIng constItutIonal provisions eoncern-
In~ a matter so important to the public interest as the legis-
latIve ~ower reserved to the people, a limitation of time may 
not be Implied where none is expressed. Both constitutional 
and. statutory provisions relating to direct legislation should 
b~ lIberally c~n~trued with a purpose to protect the reserved 
rIght of the CItIzen. (Uhl v. C~llins, 217 Cal. 1 [17 P.2d 99~ 
~~3t)L.R. 1371J; Ley v. Dom~nguez, 212 Cal. 587 [299 P: 
And .as I read the opinion in State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 
127: ?hIO St. 171 [187 N.E. 301], the decision supports the 
pOSItIon of the Secretary of State in the present case. Under 
t~e ~hio Constitution, the court held, the "preceding elec-
tion to be used as a base for computing the qualification of 
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an initiative petition "is clearly the election immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition." The record showed 
that the date of filing was one day prior to the gubernatorial 
election of 1932. Subsequent to that election the Secretary 
of State ascertained that, based upon the vote cast for Gov-
ernor in 1930, which was tho tllection for Governor next 
preceding the filing of the petition, there were insufficient 
signatures to qualify the measure. Thereafter, additional 
signatures were procured and filed. Upon the basis of the 
vote cast at the election of 1930, the' petition then had the 
necessary number to qualify the proposal. According to the 
election of 1932, it still lacked the number fixed by the Con-
stitution as requiring submission to the electors. The court 
decided that the election of 1930 governed. 
Apparently in Ohio, although a petition is circulated for 
signature in separate parts, all of the parts are filed' with 
the Secretary of State who ascertains the number of signa-
tures which are valid. The date upon which the petition 
was filed, said the court, determined the "preceding elec-
tion" which must be used as a base in determining its quali-
fication although another gubernatorial election had inter-
vened during the time allowed for securing additional signa-
tures. Using the date of filing as the decisive factor in the 
present proceeding, "the last preceding general election at 
which a Governor was elected" is the one of 1942. 
To me, the action of the Legislature of 1911 fortifies this 
conclusion, for the' statutes enacted at that time, as I read 
them, show a purpose to place a limitation upon the circu-
lation and qualification of a county and a city' initiative 
measure which does not apply to one to be submitted to the 
electors of the entire state. 'In that year, section 4058 of 
the Political Code was enacted. It made provision for the 
submission to the electors of a county of either an initiative 
or a referendum measure, and declared that any petition for 
that purpose which was found insufficient shouid be returned 
to "the person filing the same, without prejudice, however, to 
the filing of a new petition to the same effect." Other legis-
lation related to the procedure for initiative and referendum 
measures in cities and towns and also directed that any peti-
tion found insufficient should be returned to its proponent. 
(Stats. 1911, p. 359.) Subsequently, by action at the extra 
session of 1911, the Legislature declared that in lieu of r~ 
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turning an insufficient petition, it should remain on file as 
a public record. (Stats. Ex. Sess. 1911, p. 125 as to county 
measures; p. 131 as to city or town proposals.) 
Certainly the legislative action shows an awareness that 
the Constitution does not limit the time for the circulation 
and qualification of a proposed initiative measure and a de-
termination that there should be a restricted period during 
which a petition may be signed by electors and submitted to 
a vote in a county, a city or a town. The enactment of 1943 
also indicates legislative cognizance that the Constitution does 
not set any particular period for the circulation of an initia-
tive petition (other than that relating to the examination of 
signatures by local election officials), and the qualification of 
the proposal. Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution is 
self-executing, "but legislation may be enacted to facilitate 
its operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either the 
provisions of this section or the powers herein reserved." 
In connection with the declaration of the Constitution, it 
may be noted that this court, in accordance with what it 
declared to be the uniform rule, has upheld the power of 
the Legislature "to enact statutes providing for reasonable 
regulation and control of rights granted under the consti-
tutional provisions." (Ohesney v. Byram, 15 Ca1.2d 460, 
465 [101 P.2d 1106J.) Other cases to the same effect include 
First M. E. Ohurch v. Los Angelos Oounty, 204 Cal. 201 
[267 P. 703J, and Ohester v. Hall, supra. 
For these reasons and, in particular, giving effect to the 
cardinal rule of construction that every intendment of the 
constitutional provisions and of statutes enacted to facilitate 
their operation is in favor of the qualification of an initiative 
measure, I believe that the electors of the state are entitled 
to vote upon "The Retirement Life Payments Amendment." 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 
1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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WILLIAM B. McKESSON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL J. 
DONAGHUE, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Elections-Statutory Provisions - Constitutionality. -:- E~ec. 
Code, §§10600.10602, regulating the method of nomInatIng 
and voting for candidates for judicial offices only, does not 
violate the "uniformity" provisions of Const., art. I, §l1j art. 
IV §25. The distinction is It natural and reasonable one p~­su~nt to the treatment of the judiciary as a separate class In 
Const., art. VI. 
[2] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial. 01l1ce.-In de-
termining whether a candidate for judicial office must file a 
preliminary "declaration of his intention" un.der Ele.c. Cod?; 
§10601.5, when a sponsor's declaration of h1s. cand1dac~ 1S. 
executed (see Elec. Code, §§2612-2617), all pertInent sectIo~s' 
of the Elections Code must be reltd together and construed In 
a manner consistent with thf'ir respective purposes. . . 
[3] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for JUdicial Office-Construc-, 
tion of Statutes.-The efficient operation of the sponsor 
method of candidacy and the method of personal declaration, 
does not sustain the application of the provisions of Ele? 
Code, §10601 or §10601.5, to the sponsor m.ethod, and oomph-
ance with said sections is intended to be Incumbent only on, 
Cltndidates for judicial office by virtue of personal declara-
tion therefor. The five-day gap provided in Elec. CoM, 
§§10601, 10601.5, before nomination papers either by the can-
didate or sponsors may be filed correlates the purpose of the 
advance declaration of intention with the independent spon-
sor method of nomination. 
[4] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial. Office-Indication 
of Particular Office.-Elec. Code, §10602, requiring that the: 
indication of the particular judicial office for which the as-
pirant is to be a candidate must ap~ear in th~ "declaration of 
intention" should in case of a cand1date nomInated under the. 
sponsor method, ~ppear either in the sponsors' declar~tio~ of 
candidacy or in the candidate's acceptance of the nomInation. 
[5] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial O:ftice-Declara-
tion of lntention.-Inasmuch as under Elec. Code, §10601, 
10601.5, only the candidates for judicial office. may file the 
"declaration of intention," it is not necessary, In the case of 
[5J See 10 CaI.Jur. 69; 18 Am.Jur. 256. 
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